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Abstract
This paper studies competitions with rank-based reward among a large number of teams.
Within each sizable team, we consider a mean-field contribution game in which each team
member contributes to the jump intensity of a common Poisson project process; across all
teams, a mean field competition game is formulated on the rank of the completion time, namely
the jump time of Poisson project process, and the reward to each team is paid based on its
ranking. On the layer of teamwise competition game, three optimization problems are introduced
when the team size is determined by: (i) the team manager; (ii) the central planner; (iii) the
team members’ voting as partnership. We propose a relative performance criteria for each
team member to share the team’s reward and formulate some mean field games of mean field
games, which are new to the literature. In all problems with homogeneous parameters, the
equilibrium control of each worker and the equilibrium or optimal team size can be computed in
an explicit manner, allowing us to analytically examine the impacts of some model parameters
and discuss their economic implications. Two numerical examples are also presented to illustrate
the parameter dependence and comparison between different team size decision making.
Keywords: Teamwork formulation, rank-based reward, mean field game of mean field games,
optimal team size, equilibrium team size
MSC(2020): 91A16, 91B43, 93E20
1 Introduction
We are interested in some unconventional mean field games in which each “agent” is itself a team of
many, many individuals having their own interactions. Mathematically speaking, some novel mean
field games of mean field games, or two-layer mean field games, are formulated and investigated. In
particular, we consider the setting that the top layer of inter-team problem is a rank-based reward
competition game, and the bottom layer of intra-team problem is a contribution game in which
team members collaborate towards the completion of a common, reward-earning project.
Our research is mainly motivated by ubiquitous real life competitions of large firms aiming for
new product or technology development, such as the recent worldwide competition for 5G network
technology or some mega-institutions preempting their opponents in the invention of new medical
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devices. Unlike the mean field competition games based on single agents as in [3, 16, 2, 4], teamwork
formulation plays a core role in the present paper, which is rarely discussed in the existing literature,
but certainly deserves a more careful investigation. As a matter of fact, the majority of real life
competitions occur on a group basis. In industries such as manufacturing, service and technology
development, organizing workers into teams has been shown to be an effective way to enhance
productivity and teamwork can undoubtedly accelerate the completion time of the desired project
comparing to a single agent. On the other hand, a large team size may also have adverse impacts
towards its total profit. Take the company organization as an example, labor costs and other
size-related costs such as office renting, insurance payment, human resource management fees will
directly prevent the unlimited growth of the company size. More importantly, as the company size
gets larger, it has been observed in real life that employees are more likely to become free-riders or
exhibit gradualism and share the team’s reward without making much effort, see related research
in [14, 15, 8, 19, 6, 1, 7] and the references therein. Thus, when teams, especially large teams, are
taken into account, several questions naturally arise regarding each employee’s working efficiency
and organizational issues: How should members of a team share the reward more efficiently, how
will the team size affect the members’ incentive and the company’s total profit, and by what metric
can we define and quantitatively choose the optimal team size, and if teams interact with each
other, the equilibrium team size?
Dynamic contribution game in a single team with finite agents has been studied in [12], where
the project process is driven by a Brownian motion, and members jointly contribute to its drift (see
also [9] for an efficient mechanism design in the absence of noise). [12] insightfully addressed the
question of efficient team size under two types of reward sharing schemes: the public good allocation
scheme, wherein each agent receives a reward irrespective of the team size; and the budget allocation
scheme, wherein the agents share the total reward paid directly to the team. Moreover, size impacts
are examined in two scenarios: corporation with a team manager and self-organized partnership.
In the first case, the manager recruits a group of agents working for him and determines the team
size to maximize his own expected payoff, while in the second case, the project’s reward is directly
shared among all team members and the team size is decided by public voting.
Inspired by [12], we also seek to consider the two aforementioned reward allocation schemes and
the teamwork formulation of top layer corporation and partnership in the present paper. On top
of that, teams do not live in isolation, but are part of the completion time ranking game similar
to [16]. As opposed to the competition game of single agents as in [16] or the contribution game
of workers in a single team as in [12], we are interested in the teamwise competition game, which
involves a sophisticated two-layer interaction. The mutual dependence and inherently coupled
decision making, especially when the number of teams and team members are finite, may render
the equilibrium individual control impossible to obtain. As a remedy, we formulate the teamwise
competition game in the mean field sense so that the problem enjoys the decentralized structure
and the impact of an individual worker or a team on the aggregate distribution is negligible. We
can thus formally solve a stochastic control problem for a representative worker against a fixed
environment together with some consistency conditions. To make the two-layer mean field game
tractable, we adopt the simplest dynamics for our project process: an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with controlled intensity that equals the aggregate effort of all team members. In addition,
we assume homogeneity both at the team level and at the team member level, while leaving the
extension to the heterogeneous case for future study. In a teamwise competition, how the team’s
reward are shared by its members becomes crucial. We not only plan to formulate a payoff for each
worker such that the fixed point argument for the two-layer mean field game can be carried out, but
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also need to design the incentive scheme in a reasonable way to prevent free-riders or gradualism
when the team size is very large. One of our main contributions is to propose a relative performance
criterion, see the objective function in (2.2) with a bonus reward, such that the equilibrium control
can be derived explicitly, which also carries an essential encouragement effect that can successfully
eliminate the unpleasant free-riding behavior. Furthermore, in both the corporation model with
team manager (see Theorem 3.1) and the partnership model with self-organization (see Theorem
3.3), the top layer equilibrium team size can be explicitly characterized based on model parameters.
In particular, we identify conditions on the parameters when the equilibrium is not to assemble the
team, i.e., when there is no sufficient incentive for the team manager or the team member to join in
the teamwork for competitions. Some quantitative impacts of the model parameters, such as how
much bonus amount based on relative performance to pay the workers and how much wage to pay
the team manager, on a representative worker’s value function and the equilibrium team size can
be analyzed, which are consistent with observations in real lifeborganizations.
On the top layer, a third team size decision making problem is also considered that hinges on
our tractable teamwork formulation with homogeneous parameters: a central society planner, such
as the government, assigns a unified size for all teams by maximizing the average team member’s
welfare (see Theorem 3.2). In particular, one can interpret this formulation as a toy model of
planned economy when the market consists of many large state-owned enterprises and the govern-
ment decides the firm size for all. The solvable centralized optimization problem leads to possible
comparison with the model where the team size is determined by the team manager under market
competitions. The latter case can be understood as a toy model of market economy. Along this
line, we are able to numerically illustrate some interesting observations, from the perspective of
mean field competitions, that the market economy and planned economy have both pros and cons
depending sensitively on the market environment and different parameters.
Recently, there are some emerging work on mean field games and mean field control with
multiple populations, see [5] and [11] for instance, which are relatively close to the feature of
our two layer mean field game. Nevertheless, our work differs substantially from [5] and [11] in
that the number of populations or teams is infinity and the team size is also part of the control.
Furthermore, our objective functional is defined as the expected rank-based reward minus effort
and size costs while [5] and [11] mainly focus on the standard linear quadratic payoff. On the
other hand, some recent work such as [13], [10] and [17] studied the mean field team problem for a
single team with mean field interacting members, but the teamwise interaction and the equilibrium
team size choice are not considered therein. The formulation of a mean field game of mean field
games makes the present paper distinct from the existing literature and mathematically interesting.
Apart from heterogeneous teams, potential future extensions also include diffusion framework and
incorporating dynamic team size control instead of the current static team size decision making.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the teamwork formulation
and the bottom layer of intra-team mean field contribution game. The relative performance payoff
is proposed and the equilibrium control of a representative worker is solved using dynamic pro-
gramming arguments. Section 3 further considers the top layer of inter-team competition and the
team size decision making. Three distinctive models are studied and the explicit equilibrium or
optimal team size is derived in each problem. In Section 4, based on the explicit results in the
previous models, numerical examples are provided to illustrate some quantitative impacts of model
parameters on the equilibrium team size and the value of a representative worker. Some comparison
analysis between different team size decision making are also performed. Proofs of main results are
given in the Appendix A.
3
List of model parameters. For the readers’ convenience, we include here a list of all model
parameters and their meanings.
– K: the total size of the rank-based reward, excluding division effect.
– p: convexity parameter of the rank-based reward;
– ε: intra-team devision effect;
– β: proportion of the fixed salary part for a representative worker;
– θ: proportion of a team’s reward allocated to its manager;
– c: cost of effort parameter for a representative worker;
– κ0: fixed cost to build a team;
– k: coefficient of the variable size cost to build a team;
– δ: convexity parameter of the variable size cost to build a team.
2 Mean Field Collaboration Within A Team
2.1 Probabilistic Setup
We adopt the probabilistic setup of [16]. Let (I, I, µ) be an atomless probability space, in which
each i ∈ I represents a team. Let (Ω,F ,P) be another probability space supporting a family (Zi)i∈I
of exponential random variables with the unit rate. We assume that the family (Zi)i∈I is essentially
pairwise independent, meaning for µ-almost all i ∈ I, Zi is independent of Zj for µ-almost all j ∈ I.
In addition, it is assumed that (Zi)i∈I is defined on an extension of (I ⊗Ω, I ⊗F , µ⊗P) for which
the Exact Law of Large Numbers (see [18]) holds.
Define the set A0 of admissible feedback controls as the set of functions λ : [0, 1]→ R+ that are
locally piecewise Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1). For any λ ∈ A0, there exists a unique continuous
solution ρλ : R+ → [0, 1] satisfying
ρ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(ρ(s))(1− ρ(s))ds, t ≥ 0. (2.1)
Note that ρ ∈ [0, 1) if λ is bounded. We further define the stopping time
τ iλ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λ(ρλ(s))ds = Z
i
}
, i ∈ I.
The family (τ iλ)i∈I is essentially pairwise independent and corresponds to the family of first jump
times of independent inhomogeneous Poisson processes with intensity λ ◦ ρλ. By the Exact Law of
Large Numbers, we have the following lemma (cf. [16, Lemma 1]).
Lemma 2.1. Suppose all teams employ the jump intensity λ ∈ A0, then
ρλ(t) = µ
{
i : τ iλ(ω) ∈ [0, t]
}
P-a.s.
= P
(
τ iλ ∈ [0, t]
)
µ-a.s.
In other words, ρλ(t) is both the proportion of teams that have jumped (completed their projects) by
time t and the probability that a representative team has jumped (completed its project) by time t.
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We will restrict ourselves to controls belonging to a subset of A0, defined by
A :=
{
λ ∈ A0 : λ(r) > 0, ∀ r ∈ [0, 1) and
∫ 1
0
(1− x)2p−1
λ(x)
dx <∞
}
,
where p is a positive parameter to be introduced in Section 2.2.
2.2 Relative performance criterion with encouragement effect
Let us write ρ(t) := ρλ(t) for simplicity and consider a representative team (say, team i) with a
continuum of players on [0, z], where z > 0 is the size of the team and it is assumed to be fixed
in the rest of this section. It is worth noting that we are interested in the case where the number
of team members is sufficiently large. To this end, one should think of z as units of certain large
population base. For instance, z = 1.5 is interpreted as 1500 team members if 1000 is chosen as
a population base. The intra-team mean field limit corresponds to sending the population base to
infinity while keeping z finite.
Each team member or worker chooses her effort rate α ∈ A as a function of ρ(t), which then
gets aggregated into the jump intensity of the team’s Poisson project process. Suppose that all
other workers in this team choose the feedback control α¯ ∈ A, the team’s project process will follow
an inhomogeneous Poisson process with jump intensity zα¯ ◦ ρ. Let us denote by τ := τ izα¯ its first
jump time which signals the completion of the project by this team.
A representative worker in the team needs to solve the stochastic control problem in a fixed
environment defined by
sup
α∈A
E
[
Gz(ρ(τ))
(
β + (1− β)α(ρ(τ))
α¯(ρ(τ))
)
− c
∫ τ
0
α(ρ(t))2 dt
]
, (2.2)
where c > 0 is the cost of effort parameter, Gz(r) is the per person reward paid to a team of
rank r ∈ [0, 1], and ρ(τ) is the rank of team i, measured as the proportion of teams that have
jumped before or at the same time as team i (so that r = 0 corresponds to the top rank and r = 1
corresponds to the bottom rank). We use the convention that ρ(∞) := 1 and α(1)/α¯(1) := 1,
meaning that teams who never complete the project receive the bottom rank, and all members of
bottom ranking teams receive Gz(1) regardless of their relative performance within the team.
It is assumed henceforth in this paper that the reward function Gz takes the specific form:
Gz(r) = K(1 + p)(1− r)p · z−ε, K, p > 0, ε ∈ [0, 1].
Here K represents the total reward pie shared by all teams, and p depicts how skewed the reward
is towards top ranking teams. A large p value indicates that most of the reward is given to highly
ranked teams, which is consistent with the wealth distribution of our society that some top ranked
groups earn the majority chunk of the social wealth pie. Moreover, ε here captures the intra-team
division effect due to the team size. For example, if ε = 0, there is no division effect and Gz
corresponds to the public good allocation scheme under which each agent receives the same reward
regardless of the team size. If ε = 1, the total reward for the team is relatively fixed and Gz
corresponds to the budget allocation scheme as all team members will share a fixed pie.
Our proposed payoff for a representative worker in (2.2) is said to be a relative performance
criterion. This is reflected both at the team’s level via rank-based rewards and at the team member’s
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level via the term α/α¯, which captures the relative effort when the milestone of the project is
achieved. It is worth noting that the payoff consists of a fixed salary part βGz(ρ(τ)) as well as a
performance-based bonus part (1− β)Gz(ρ(τ))αα¯(ρ(τ)), where the proportion β ∈ [0, 1) determines
how the rank-based reward is split between the two parts.1 In principle, the bonus term from
relative effort can stimulate the diligence of team members.
In some real life situations, the bonus income may dominate the regular salary part significantly.
Admittedly, it may not be the best choice to pay the bonus based on the effort at the completion
time directly. However, as the completion time is characterized as the jump time of a Poisson process
which is memoryless, each worker has no incentives to wait and be lazy, because she may miss the
chance to make higher efforts when the jump time suddenly occurs. This incentivizes everyone to
be diligent from the beginning and compete with peers by sustaining higher efforts than others
at the completion time. This feature in our formulation can be interpreted as the encouragement
effect that may prevent free-riding in large teams. Mathematically speaking, our choice of the
control ratio α(ρ(τ))/α¯(ρ(τ)) at the completion time in the bonus income term remarkably yields
fully explicit value function and best response control of the representative worker. These explicit
formulas significantly simplify the fixed point argument for the inter-team equilibrium, rendering
some economic observations and implications possible.
2.3 Equilibrium control for each team member
Having introduced our objective functional for the representative worker, we proceed to study her
best response control, given that all of her co-workers use control α¯ ∈ A.
The dynamic version of (2.2) is defined as
V (r) = V (r;λ, z, α¯) := sup
α∈A
J(r, α;λ, z, α¯), r ∈ [0, 1],
where
J(r, α;λ, z, α¯) := E
[
Gz(ρ(τ)) ·
(
β + (1− β)α(ρ(τ))
α¯(ρ(τ))
)
− c
∫ τ
0
α2(ρ(t)) dt
∣∣∣ρ(0) = r] ,
and ρ satisfies (2.1). Assume λ ∈ A. The associated dynamic programming equation can be
heuristically derived as
λ(1− r)V ′ + sup
α≥0
{[
Gz ·
(
β + (1− β)α
α¯
)
− V
]
· zα¯− cα2
}
= 0, (2.3)
with the boundary condition V (1) = 0.
By the first order condition, a candidate best response control is given by
αz(r) =
(1− β)zGz(r)
2c
. (2.4)
Note that αz(r) ≡ 0 if β = 1, i.e. if there is no bonus income. This is what we called the free-riding
behavior as the best response is to do nothing and simply wait for the fixed salary generated by
1To simplify the presentation, let us assume that β is a constant. The main results can be easily extend to the
cases when β is a function of the team size z. In particular, Theorem 2.1 remains valid.
6
co-workers, due to the lack of incentives for diligence. This justifies the necessity for us to introduce
the bonus income based on relative effort in the teamwork formulation with a large population base.
For the existence of equilibrium, we then impose the consistency condition that
α¯ = αz =
(1− β)zGz
2c
.
Substituting the above α¯ and αz back into (2.3) yields
λ(1− r)V ′ − 1− β
2c
z2Gz · V + 1− β
2
4c
z2G2z = 0, V (1) = 0. (2.5)
This is a first order linear ODE that can be solved explicitly, which leads to the following main
result of this section. A rigorous proof is postponed to Section A.
Theorem 2.1. Let the size z > 0 of a team and the jump intensity λ ∈ A of all other teams
be given. There exists a unique equilibrium effort αz ∈ A within the team, given by (2.4). In
equilibrium, the value function of each team member before project completion, denote by Vλ,z, is
Vλ,z(r) =
1− β2
4c
z2
∫ 1
r
G2z(x)
λ(x)(1− x) · exp
(
−1− β
2c
z2
∫ x
r
Gz(y)
λ(y)(1− y)dy
)
dx
=
1− β2
4c
K2(1 + p)2z2−2ε
∫ 1
r
(1− x)2p−1
λ(x)
· exp
(
−K(1 + p)(1− β)
2c
z2−ε
∫ x
r
(1− y)p−1
λ(y)
dy
)
dx.
(2.6)
Remark 2.1. From (2.6), we can see that if ε ∈ [0, 1), then Vλ,z(0) → 0 as z → 0. Intuitively, if
the size of the team is very small, it is very likely that the team’s ranking will not be good due to
insufficient labor. A more interesting observation is that Vλ,z(0)→ 0 as z →∞ even if ε = 0. An
explanation is that, if the team size is very large, the unexpected jump may happen very soon. As
the payoff for each worker depends on her relative contribution, she will try to maintain high effort
at any time in order to get a higher reward when the jump happens, which results in a significant
cost of effort that offsets the benefit of an increased reward. In other words, the larger the team
size, the higher peer competition and peer pressure each worker may confront within the team in
our setting with bonus income.
Remark 2.2. The above theorem is valid under the assumption that λ is strictly positive on [0, 1).
If λ ≡ 0, which may be a result of the other teams choosing zero team size (assuming it is allowed),
then the state process ρ ≡ ρ(0) and we have that for z > 0, r < 1,
J(r, α; 0, z, α¯) = Gz(r) ·
(
β + (1− β)α(r)
α¯(r)
)
P(τ <∞)− cα2(r)Eτ
= Gz(r) ·
(
β + (1− β)α(r)
α¯(r)
)
− cα
2(r)
zα¯(r)
= βGz(r) +
1
α¯(r)
[
Gz(r)(1− β)α(r)− c
z
α2(r)
]
,
where we have used that the controlled jump time τ = τzα¯ is exponentially distributed with rate
zα¯(r). Here r = ρ(0) is a fixed number, and r > 0 means that an r-fraction of teams have already
jumped and the remaining ones have zero team size and thus zero jump intensity. We easily see
that the unique intra-team equilibrium effort in this case is again given by (2.4) with associated
value
V0,z(r) =
1 + β
2
Gz(r). (2.7)
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The quantity Vzαz ,z(0) will play an important role in the later analysis. It represents the
expected payoff of a team member if all of her peers, within or outside the team, use control αz,
and all teams are of the size z > 0. So we compute it here for the easy future reference:
Vzαz ,z(0) =
K(1 + β)
2
z−ε. (2.8)
Recall that K is the total rank-based reward shared by all teams (or average reward per team since
the team space has measure one). The factor (1 + β)/2 < 1 accounts for the loss due to the cost of
effort.
3 Mean Field Competition Among Teams
This section begins to study the top layer game among a continuum of teams which are assumed
to be homogeneous. The game starts fresh with ρ(0) = 0, and all teams compete for the ranking of
completion times which are modeled as the first jump time of independent inhomogeneous Poisson
processes (see the model setup in Section 2.1). From this point onwards, the team size is no
longer priorly fixed. Instead, it is the team’s task to determine the team size for its own profit.
In particular, we intend to derive the equilibrium solution of the two-layer mean field game and
investigate the impacts of the team size on the representative worker’s effort and expected payoff.
The benefit for having a larger team size is the greater likelihood of an earlier jump time. On
the flip side, assembling a team is costly. To account for various size-related costs, we introduce
a fixed cost κ0 ≥ 0 to build the team as well as a non-decreasing variable size cost κ(z) for each
team, defined as
κ(z) = k · zδ, k, δ > 0.
In the subsequent sections, we will examine three different types of decision making over the team
size and the equilibrium solution of the associated two-layer mean field games.
3.1 Equilibrium Team Size by Team Managers
In this section, we assume that each team has its own manager, who decides the optimal team size
z at the initial time. The team manager recruits team members to work on his behalf, and he will
get a proportion θ ∈ (0, 1) of the team’s total gain K(1 + p)(1− ρ(τ))p = zεGz(ρ(τ)) and allocate
the remaining reward to all team members.2
Meanwhile, the manager is responsible for all size-related costs for the team; that is, he needs
to pay the fixed cost κ0 to build the team and the variable size cost κ(z) given that the team is
successfully assembled with positive size z. Along this line, given the team size z > 0, each worker
2Here the intra-team division effect only applies to the regular team members’ share of the reward, namely,
(1− θ)K(1 +p)(1−ρ(τ))p. In the public good allocation scheme (ε = 0), the manager and the each member’s reward
have the same order of magnitude; in the budget allocation scheme (ε = 1), the manager receives a chunk of the fixed
pie while each member shares a negligible piece of the remaining pie.
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or regular team member faces the optimization problem:
sup
α∈A
E
[
(1− θ)Gz(ρ(τ)) ·
(
β + (1− β)α(ρ(τ))
α¯(ρ(τ))
)
− c
∫ τ
0
α(ρ(t))2 dt
]
= (1− θ) sup
α∈A
E
[
Gz(ρ(τ)) ·
(
β + (1− β)α(ρ(τ))
α¯(ρ(τ))
)
− c¯
∫ τ
0
α(ρ(t))2 dt
]
,
where c¯ := c/(1− θ).
Let us focus on a representative team, again named i. Suppose that all other teams pick a jump
intensity λ ∈ A or λ ≡ 0 and that the manager of team i chooses a team size of z > 0. In view of
Theorem 2.1 and Remark 2.2, the intra-team equilibrium effort is
αz =
(1− β)
2c¯
zGz, (3.1)
which lies in A and happens to be independent of λ. Having the equilibrium effort in mind, the
manager of team i then maximizes his own objective function
Jm(z;λ) := 1{z>0} (θE [zεGz(ρλ(τλ,z))]− κ0 − κ(z))
over size z ≥ 0, where τλ,z is the jump time of team i when all of its members use control αz. Here
we allow the manager to choose zero team size, meaning that the team is not assembled and will
never complete the project. We set α0 :≡ 0 for the case z = 0, which is consistent with the formula
for positive z.
Remark 3.1. It is worth noting that our team manager model differs from the standard principal-
agent problem with infinitely many agents (e.g. [10]). The role of the team manager in our model
is to statically decide the constant team size at the initial time instead of controlling the incentive
of each agent. The reward and bonus income weight to each worker are fixed and not determined
by the team manager. Moreover, all team managers interact with each other through the inter-team
competition. It will be more interesting yet more complicated to formulate the intra-team problem
with a team manager as a principal-agent problem in future research, in which the principal can
control the reward paid to the workers as well as a team size that dynamically evolves over time.
We now give the exact definition of a Nash equilibrium in the two-layer mean field game.
Definition 3.1. A pair (z∗, α∗) ∈ R+×A is said to be an equilibrium for the two-layer mean field
game with manager-selected team sizes if
z∗ ∈ arg max
z≥0
Jm(z; z∗α∗) and α∗ = αz∗ .
That is, z∗ is the optimal size of a representative team given that all other teams choose size z∗ and
individual control α∗; and α∗ is the intra-team equilibrium control given that all teams including
the representative one have size z∗. We refer to such a z∗ as an equilibrium team size and such an
α∗ as the associated equilibrium effort.
By definition, z∗ is an equilibrium team size if and only if either
z∗ = 0 and sup
z>0
{θzεGz(0)− κ0 − κ(z)} ≤ 0,
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or
z∗ > 0 and z∗ ∈ arg max
z≥0
{
1{z>0} (θE [zεGz(ρλ∗(τλ∗,z))]− κ0 − κ(z))
}
,
where
λ∗ = z∗αz∗ =
(1− β)
2c¯
(z∗)2Gz∗ .
The first case occurs if and only if K(1+p)θ ≤ κ0. In the second case, the quantity E[Gz(ρλ∗(τλ∗,z))]
can be computed as the initial value of the solution v(r) to the following terminal value problem:
λ∗(1− r)v′ − 1− β
2c¯
z2Gz · v + 1− β
2c¯
z2G2z = 0, v(1) = 0.
Solving the above first order ODE, we obtain that
E[Gz(ρλ∗(τλ∗,z))] = v(0) =
( z
z∗
)2 ∫ 1
0
G2z(r)
(1− r)Gz∗(r) exp
(
−
( z
z∗
)2 ∫ r
0
Gz(y)
(1− y)Gz∗(y)dy
)
dr
= K(1 + p)z−ε
[
1 + p
( z
z∗
)ε−2]−1
.
Hence, the set of positive equilibrium team sizes can be characterized as all points z∗ > 0 satisfying
z∗ ∈ arg max
z>0
{
K(1 + p)θ
[
1 + p
( z
z∗
)ε−2]−1 − κ(z)} (3.2)
and
Kθ − κ0 − κ(z∗) ≥ 0. (3.3)
The expression of E[Gz(ρλ∗(τλ∗,z))] also implies that at any equilibrium (z∗, α∗) with z∗ > 0, the
value V m for the team manager is given by
V m = θE[(z∗)εGz∗(ρλ∗(τz∗))]− κ0 − κ(z∗) = Kθ − κ0 − κ(z∗), (3.4)
which is guaranteed to be non-negative by (3.3). Meanwhile, the value function V w of each regular
team member or worker can be computed from (2.8), giving that for z∗ > 0,
V w = (1− θ)Vz∗α∗,z∗(0) = K(1− θ)(1 + β)
2
(z∗)−ε, (3.5)
which is positive as granted.
Up to this point, we have not used the explicit form of κ(z). It turns out that with our choice
of κ(z) = kzδ, (3.2)-(3.5) can be significantly simplified, leading to a complete characterization of
the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Let parameters 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, β ∈ [0, 1), κ0 ≥ 0 as well as K, p, θ, k, δ, c > 0 be given.
(i) If K(1+p)θ ≤ κ0, the unique equilibrium for the two-layer mean field game is (z∗, α∗) = (0, 0).
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(ii) If
[
1− κ0Kθ
]
δ ≥ (2−ε)p1+p which implies K(1 + p)θ > κ0, the unique equilibrium team size is
z∗m =
[
Kθp(2− ε)
kδ(1 + p)
] 1
δ
> 0. (3.6)
The associated equilibrium effort, the value for the team manager and each worker are given
respectively by
α∗m(r) =
K(1 + p)(1− β)(1− θ)
2c
(z∗m)
1−ε(1− r)p,
V m =
Kθ[p(ε+ δ − 2) + δ]
δ(1 + p)
− κ0 ≥ 0, (3.7)
V w =
K(1− θ)(1 + β)
2
(z∗m)
−ε.
(iii) In all other cases, an equilibrium does not exist.
Remark 3.2. (a) Observe that in the case where a positive equilibrium team size exists, the equi-
librium team size z∗m, the associated manager’s value V m and the representative worker’s value V w
are all independent of the cost parameter c. Similar phenomenon can be observed in the central
planner’s case (Sec 3.2) and the partnership case (Sec 3.3) as well. This is a feature of the Poisson
model and relative performance criteria which is in line with [16]. A larger c implies smaller effort.
But when every co-worker and competing teams do so in equilibrium, the relative contribution α/α¯
and the team’s rank ρ(τ) remain unchanged, and the reduced cost per unit time for each worker is
exactly offset by the the increased completion time τ .
(b) It is also interesting to note that the equilibrium team size z∗m and the manager’s value V m
are independent of the base salary weight β, while the equilibrium effort α∗ of each representative
worker is decreasing in β. If we take β as a control so that the team manager is responsible for
designing the reward contract to distribute the weight between the base salary and the bonus income
for each worker, it follows that a higher bonus income (smaller β) induces higher effort. However,
this is at the expense of a smaller worker’s value V w. In addition, since V m is independent of β,
the team manager has no incentive to raise the proportion of the bonus income. This is also related
to the fact that we have a purely rank-based competition between teams where larger effort does not
leads to larger expected reward if all other teams raise their intensity in equilibrium.
(c) Finally, we see from (3.6) that in case (ii), the equilibrium team size z∗m is increasing in θ,
the team manger’s share of the reward. As one would expect, V m given in (3.7) is increasing in θ,
which follows from
δ ≥
[
1− κ0
Kθ
]
δ ≥ (2− ε)p
1 + p
=⇒ (ε+ δ − 2)p+ δ ≥ 0.
The worker’s value V w is decreasing in θ, but only for θ ≥ κ0δ(1+p)K[δ+(δ+ε−2)p] which ensures the existence
of a positive equilibrium team size. When θ is very small, we fall into case (i) where the team
manager has no incentive to assemble the team, giving each worker zero value.
3.2 Optimal Team Size by A Central Planner
In this section, we consider another interesting problem when the size of all (homogeneous) teams
is decided by a central planner of the whole society instead of each team manager. To this end,
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we look for an optimal team size rather than an equilibrium team size. The assumption that the
central planner takes the role to determine the unified team size can be seen as an example of the
planned economy, in which each team represents a state-owned company. It is sometimes important
for the government to wisely control the size of these large firms to benefit each individual’s welfare
in the society. This section provides a tractable model in the mean field sense for such a centralized
optimization problem.
In the central planner’s problem, the crux of the matter is to look for a unified team size so that
each individual worker’s average welfare in the team can be maximized as a static optimization
problem:3
V c := sup
z≥0
{
1{z>0}
(
Vzαz ,z(0)−
κ0 + κ(z)
z
)}
,
where Vzαz ,z(0) is given in (2.8).
Let us denote by h(z) the function to be maximized above. By (2.8), we get
h(z) = 1{z>0}
(
K(1 + β)
2
z−ε − κ0z−1 − k zδ−1
)
.
The next result on the optimal team size follows by straightforward computation and its proof
is hence omitted.
Theorem 3.2. Let parameters κ0 ≥ 0, β ∈ [0, 1) and K, p, k, δ, c > 0 be given.
Case I: ε = 0 (public good allocation scheme). In this case, we have the following:
• If 0 < δ < 1, there is no optimal team size.
• If δ = 1 and κ0 > 0, then z∗ = 0 is the unique optimal team size if K(1+β)2 ≤ k and there is
no optimal team size if K(1+β)2 > k.
• If δ = 1 and κ0 = 0, we have the subcases:
– If K(1+β)2 < k, z
∗ = 0 is the unique optimal team size;
– If K(1+β)2 = k, any z
∗ ≥ 0 is an optimal team size;
– If K(1+β)2 > k, any positive team size is an optimal team size.
• If δ > 1 and κ0 = 0, there is no optimal team size.
• If δ > 1 and κ0 > 0, let us define
z∗c :=
[
κ0
k(δ − 1)
]1/δ
(3.8)
and V c :=
K(1 + β)
2
− κ0δ
δ − 1
[
κ0
k(δ − 1)
]−1/δ
. (3.9)
Then we have:
3One could also consider other criteria for the central planner, such as minimizing a given quantile of the completion
time distribution or maximizing the total welfare of a team.
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– If K(1+β)2 >
κ0δ
δ−1
[
κ0
k(δ−1)
]−1/δ
, z∗c defined in (3.8) is the unique positive optimal team size
and the intra-team equilibrium control is given by α∗c(r) =
K(1+p)(1−β)
2c z
∗
c (1 − r)p. The
function V c > 0 defined in (3.9) is the associated value of a representative worker;
– If K(1+β)2 =
κ0δ
δ−1
[
κ0
k(δ−1)
]−1/δ
, z∗ = 0 is another optimal team size in addition to z∗c given
in (3.8);
– If K(1+β)2 <
κ0δ
δ−1
[
κ0
k(δ−1)
]−1/δ
, z∗ = 0 is the unique optimal team size.
Case II: ε = 1 (budget allocation scheme). In this case, we have the following:
• If κ0 < K(1+β)2 , then h(0+) =∞ and there is no optimal team size.
• If κ0 ≥ K(1+β)2 , then z∗ = 0 is the unique optimal team size.
Case III: 0 < ε < 1. In this case, we can provide some sufficient conditions for the optimal
team size:
• If κ0 = 0 and δ ≥ 1, there is no optimal team size.
• If κ0 = 0 and 0 < δ < 1, let us define
z∗c :=
(
εK(1 + β)
2(1− δ)k
) 1
δ+ε−1
(3.10)
and V c :=
K(1 + β)
2
(
εK(1 + β)
2(1− δ)k
) −ε
δ+ε−1
− k
(
εK(1 + β)
2(1− δ)k
) δ−1
δ+ε−1
. (3.11)
– If 1 − δ > ε, z∗c defined in (3.10) is the unique optimal team size and the intra-team
equilibrium control by the representative worker is α∗c =
K(1+p)(1−β)
2c (z
∗
c )
1−ε(1− r)p. The
associated value of a representative worker is given by V c > 0 in (3.11);
– If 1− δ = ε, we have two sub-cases:
∗ If K(1+β)2 > k, there is no optimal team size;
∗ If K(1+β)2 = k, any z∗ ≥ 0 is an optimal team size;
∗ If K(1+β)2 < k, z∗ = 0 is the unique optimal team size.
– If 1− δ < ε, there is no optimal team size.
• If κ0 > 0 and δ ≥ 1, it is easy to see that there exists a unique positive root z∗c of the algebraic
equation
−εK(1 + β)
2
z1−ε + κ0 − k(δ − 1)zδ = 0. (3.12)
If we further have h(z∗c ) > 0 which can be guaranteed e.g. when
K(1+β)
2 > k + κ0, then the
unique optimal team size is given by the unique positive root z∗c of (3.12). The intra-team
equilibrium control is α∗c =
K(1+p)(1−β)
2c (z
∗
c )
1−ε(1−r)p, and the value of a representative worker
is given by
V c := κ0
(
1
ε
− 1
)
1
z∗c
− k
(
1 +
δ − 1
ε
)
(z∗c )
δ−1 > 0.
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Remark 3.3. In the budget allocation scheme (ε = 1), we see that the central planner prefers not
to assemble the teams as either there is no optimal team size or the unique optimal solution is zero
size. This can be explained by the fact that the reward to each worker under the budget allocation
scheme is dominated by the effort cost and therefore there is no sufficient incentive for the worker
to join the team in this case.
In Theorem 3.2, we have several parameter regimes under which there is no optimal team size
because the target function h(z) attains its maximum (possibly ∞) as z → 0 (for instance, when
κ0 <
K(1+β)
2 under the budget allocation scheme ε = 1) or as z →∞ (for instance, when 0 < δ < 1
or when δ = 1, κ0 > 0 and
K(1+β)
2 > k under the public good allocation scheme ε = 0). In reality,
however, we usually have some lower and upper bounds for the value of z in view that z stands
for the number of units of certain large population base. To ensure that the mean field interactions
can be applied, the population within each team needs to be sufficiently large, which requires that
the value of z cannot be too small when the population base is chosen. On the other hand, when
the population within a team is very large, it is natural to increase the population base instead of
the units so that the value of z usually lies in some reasonable finite range. Therefore, it is by no
means restrictive in applications to exclude these parameter regions when there is no optimal team
size. In our numerical examples in Section 4, we will only focus on the parameter values when an
optimal team size exists.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.2 presents three cases with a unique non-trivial optimal team size:
(a) ε = 0, δ > 1, κ0 > 0 and
K(1+β)
2 >
κ0δ
δ−1
[
κ0
k(δ−1)
]−1/δ
;
(b) 0 < ε, δ < 1, ε+ δ < 1 and κ0 = 0;
(c) 0 < ε < 1, δ ≥ 1, κ0 > 0 and K(1+β)2 > k + κ0.
Note that the boundary of the parameter regime (a) depends on the base salary weight β, but within
the regime, the optimal team size z∗c is constant in β. This is because when ε = 0, the equilibrium
reward4 Vzαz ,z(0) each worker receives is independent of the team size z (see (2.8)). So the optimal
team size is solely determined by the cost of building the team, while β affects the reward but not
the cost. In contrast, in cases (b) and (c) where ε > 0, the quantity Vzαz ,z(0) is decreasing in z.
Since Vzαz ,z(0) depends positively on β, as β increases, the central planner is motivated to choose
a smaller team size so that each worker can get a larger share of the increased reward.
It is worth pointing out that in our model, the inter-team competition has a fixed reward pie that
is shared purely based on relative performance. If absolute performance or effort level also enter
into the reward scheme, then the dependence of Vzαz ,z(0) on β will likely be more complicated, since
a larger β leads to more serious free-rider problem, which apart from reducing the cost of effort,
will also have a negative impact on the team’s reward.
3.3 Equilibrium Team Size with Partnership
In this section, we analyze the model when all teams are assembled neither by team managers nor
a central planner, but directly by a group of workers joining together as a partnership. The team
4Here we refer to Vzαz ,z(0) as “equilibrium reward” to separate it from size-related costs in the definition of V
c.
It should be understood that Vzαz ,z(0) includes the cost of effort.
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size is determined by public voting to maximize each worker’s benefit. Each team still competes
with all other teams though the rank-based reward, and the goal is to find the equilibrium team
size in the framework of partnership for each team.
We focus on the static decision making over the team size using the representative worker’s
expected payoff instead of the payoff by the team manager. We again focus on a representative
team i and assume that all other teams choose the same jump intensity λ ∈ A or λ ≡ 0. After
public voting in the partnership setting, a representative team member from team i needs to solve
an optimization problem
sup
z≥0
[
1{z>0}
(
Vλ,z(0)− κ0 + κ(z)
z
)]
,
where Vλ,z(0), given by (2.6) for λ ∈ A or (2.7) for λ ≡ 0, represents the intra-team value of a
representative worker in team i.
Let us denote the objective function
Jp(z;λ) := 1{z>0}
(
Vλ,z(0)− κ0 + κ(z)
z
)
.
We then give the definition of a Nash equilibrium in the setting of two-layer mean field game
with partnership.
Definition 3.2. A pair (z∗, α∗) ∈ R+×A is said to be an equilibrium for the two-layer mean field
game with partnership if
z∗ ∈ arg max
z≥0
Jp(z, z∗α∗) and α∗ = αz∗ .
That is, z∗ is the optimal size determined by public voting given that all other teams choose the size
z∗ and the individual control α∗; and α∗ is the intra-team equilibrium control given that all teams
including the representative one have size z∗. We refer to such a z∗ as an equilibrium team size
with partnership and such an α∗ as the associated equilibrium effort.
By its definition, z∗ is an equilibrium team size if and only if either
z∗ = 0 and sup
z>0
(
1 + β
2
Gz(0)− κ0 + kz
δ
z
)
≤ 0,
or
z∗ > 0 and z∗ ∈ arg max
z≥0
{
1{z>0}
(
Vλ∗,z(0)− κ0 + kz
δ
z
)}
,
where
λ∗(x) = z∗αz∗ =
(1− β)K(1 + p)
2c
(z∗)2−(1− x)p.
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In the first case, let us recall that Gz(0) = K(1 + p) · z−. In the second case with z∗ > 0, in
view of (2.6), to find the equilibrium team size z∗ is equivalent to maximize the function
H(z; z∗) :=Jp(z;λ∗)
=
1− β2
4c
K2(1 + p)2z2−2ε
∫ 1
0
(1− x)2p−1
λ∗(x)
exp
(
−K(1 + p)(1− β)
2c
z2−ε
∫ x
0
(1− y)p−1
λ∗(y)
dy
)
dx
− κ0 + kz
δ
z
=
K(1 + p)(1 + β)z2−2ε
2(z∗)2−ε
1
p+ ( zz∗ )
2−ε −
κ0 + kz
δ
z
. (3.13)
As the target functions are quite complicated comparing with the model with team managers or
a central planner, we only provide some sufficient conditions on model parameters for the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the model with partnership. We have the following results on
the equilibrium pair (z∗, α∗).
Theorem 3.3. Let parameters κ0 ≥ 0, β ∈ [0, 1) and K, p, k, δ, c > 0 be given.
Case I: ε = 0 (public good allocation scheme). We have the following results:
(i) Assume κ0 = 0. Then z
∗ = 0 is an equilibrium team size if and only if δ = 1 and (1+β)2 K(1 +
p) ≤ k.
(ii) Assume κ0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]∪ [2,∞). Then z∗ = 0 is an equilibrium team size if and only if
2δ(κ0)
δ−1kδδ
(1 + β)δKδ(1 + p)δ(δ − 1)δ−1 ≥ 1.
(iii) Assume δ ≥ 3 and p ≥ 1/3. Let z∗p be the unique positive solution to the algebraic equation
pK(1 + β)
1 + p
z + k(1− δ)zδ + κ0 = 0.
Let us define the function
V p :=
K(1 + β)
2
− κ0(z∗p)−1 − k(z∗p)δ−1.
Then z∗p is the unique positive equilibrium team size if and only if V p ≥ 0; in this case, the
corresponding equilibrium individual control is α∗p(r) =
K(1+p)(1−β)
2c z
∗
p(1 − r)p, and V p is the
associated value of each representative worker.
Case II: ε = 1 (budget allocation scheme). We have the following results:
(i) z∗ = 0 is an equilibrium team size if and only if (1+β)2 K(1 + p) ≤ κ0.
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(ii) Assume δ ≥ 2, 2(1 + δ) > (1 + p)2 and K(1+β)2(1+p) < κ0. Define the positive constant z∗p by
z∗p =
κ0 − K(1+β)2(1+p)
k(δ − 1)
 1δ . (3.14)
and the function
V p :=
K(1 + β)
2
(z∗p)
−1 − κ0(z∗p)−1 − k(z∗p)δ−1.
Then z∗p is the unique positive equilibrium team size if and only if V p ≥ 0, which is also
equivalent to
κ0 ≤ K(1 + β)
2(1 + p)
· 1 + (δ − 1)(1 + p)
δ
; (3.15)
in this case, the equilibrium individual control is given by α∗p(r) =
K(1+p)(1−β)
2c z
∗
p(1− r)p, and
V p is the associated value of each representative worker.
Remark 3.5. Note the ranges of κ0 in (3.15) and Case II of Theorem 3.2. It can be shown that
K(1 + β)
2(1 + p)
· 1 + (δ − 1)(1 + p)
δ
<
K(1 + β)
2
.
Therefore, in the case given by (3.15) there is no optimal team size for the corresponding central
planner problem. On the other hand, when ε = 1 and κ0 ≥ K(1+β)2 there is no positive equilibrium
team size for the partnership problem by Case II of Theorem 3.2.
It can be easily shown that in Case I (iii) of Thereom 3.3, both z∗p and the associated V p is
increasing with respect to (w.r.t.) β; in Case II (ii) z∗p is decreasing and the associated V p is
increasing w.r.t. β. Below we provide more general results regarding the monotonicity of z∗p and
V p w.r.t. β.
Proposition 3.1. Let parameters δ > 1, ε ∈ [0, 1], and K,κ0, k > 0 be given. Let A be a connected
interval in [0, 1]. Suppose for any β ∈ A there exists a positive equilibrium team size z∗p = z∗p(β).
Then z∗p is unique and monotone w.r.t. β on A. Specifically, we have that
• if 2p− 2pε− ε > 0, then z∗p is increasing w.r.t. β;
• if 2p− 2pε− ε = 0, then z∗p is independent of β;
• if 2p− 2pε− ε < 0, then z∗p is decreasing w.r.t. β.
Remark 3.6. As ε gets larger, there is more division effect. Note that the function in (3.13) is
increasing w.r.t. β. As a result, for relatively large ε, there is more incentive to choose a small size
in order to get a larger pie when β is large. That is, z∗p is more likely to be decreasing w.r.t. β when
ε is large, which is the implication of the above result.
Proposition 3.2. Let parameters δ > 1, ε ∈ [0, 1], and K,κ0, k > 0 be given. Suppose z∗p = z∗p(β)
is the unique positive equilibrium team size for any β ∈ A ⊂ [0, 1], where A is a connected interval.
From (3.13) we define the value for each team member under z∗p by
V p(β, z∗p(β)) := V
p(β, z∗p) :=
K(1 + β)
2
(z∗p)
−ε − κ0 + k(z
∗
p)
δ
z∗p
.
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If 2p− 2pε− ε ≤ 0, or 2p− 2pε− ε > 0 and p(2−ε)(p+1)(δ+ε−1) ≤ 1, then β 7→ V p(β, z∗p(β)) is increasing
on A.
Remark 3.7. As β ∈ A gets larger, there is less competition in the same team and thus less effort
cost and more reward. The only possibility of V p getting smaller would be due to the change of team
size z∗p(β). The above result indicates that the change of z∗p (as β ∈ A gets larger) would either lead
to an increase in V p, or be dominated by the increase of V p due to less competition.
4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we choose a representative worker’s value under the equilibrium or optimal team
size as the metric to compare which model works better for the team size decision making problem.
Our numerical figures illustrate that all models have their pros and cons depending on the model
parameters.
Recall that V w, V c, V p denote a worker or a regular team member’s value in Sections 3.1-3.3
under the equilibrium or optimal team size respectively. From their definitions, we always have the
order that
V c ≥ V p.
However, the comparison between V w and V c or V w and V p is not straightforward and can lead
to several interesting economic insights. In particular, we will fix parameters K, p, ε, δ, k, κ0 and
treat either θ or β as the variable to illustrate its quantitative impact on each worker’s value and
the equilibrium or optimal team size. We can also numerically split the regions of θ or β such that
the value functions may dominate each other in different regions to make the comparison analysis
among three different models.
4.1 Example 1
We first choose θ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. the proportion of team’s reward allocated to the team manager, as
the changing variable and set other model parameters K = 20/3, δ = 4, p = 2, k = 1, β = 0.4 and
κ0 = 2. We aim to plot comparison figures under the public good allocation scheme ε = 0.
In the model with team managers, it follows from Theorem 3.1 (i) that K(1+p)θ ≤ κ0 becomes
θ ≤ 0.1. Therefore, on the variable region θ ∈ (0, 0.1], the equilibrium team size z∗m = 0. That
is, the team manager will not assemble the team and the value function of the worker is V w = 0.
On the other hand, by Theorem 3.1 (ii), we have that
[
1− κ0Kθ
]
δ ≥ (2−ε)p1+p is satisfied if and only
if θ ≥ 0.45. That is, for the variable region θ ∈ [0.45, 1), the equilibrium team size is given by
z∗m =
(
20
9 θ
) 1
4 and the value function of the worker’s is described by V w = 143 (1 − θ). For the
remaining region θ ∈ (0.1, 0.45), the equilibrium team size does not exist according to Theorem 3.1
(iii).
In the second model with a central planner, the condition K(1+β)2 >
κ0δ
δ−1
[
κ0
k(δ−1)
]−1/δ
is satisfied
by our chosen parameters in the case ε = 0 in Theorem 3.2, which gives the optimal team size
by z∗c ≈ 0.904 and the corresponding optimal value of a representative worker is computed by
V c ≈ 1.716.
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In the third model with partnership within each team, as δ = 4 and p = 2, by item (iii) in the
case ε = 0 of Theorem 3.3, the equilibrium team size z∗p is the unique positive root of the algebraic
equation
−3z4 + 56
9
z + 2 = 0
which gives that z∗p ≈ 1.368 and the value of the worker is V p ≈ 0.644.
Based on the computations above, we plot and compare in Figures 1 and 2 the three values V w,
V c and V p and the three different team sizes z∗m, z∗c and z∗p as functions of the variable θ ∈ (0, 1),
under the public good allocation scheme ε = 0.
Figure 1 Figure 2
From Figure 1, we can see that the team manager has no incentives to assemble the team (either
because the equilibrium team size is zero or there is no equilibrium team size) to work on his behalf
if he can only earn a small proportion θ < 0.45 from the team’s total gain K(1+p)(1−ρ(τ))p for the
given parameters. When the team manager is allowed to acquire a higher proportion θ ≥ 0.45 from
the team’s total gain, both the team manager and the representative worker become motivated
to take part in the teamwork with different roles. Within a reasonable region θ ∈ [0.45, 0.632],
it becomes a win-win situation between the team manager and the hired worker as both of them
can attain high values V m and V w. More importantly, by comparing three curves in Figure 1,
we can see that V w ≥ V c on θ ∈ [0.45, 0.632], which implies that the cost sharing mechanism in
the design of the first model totally beats the wage paid to the team manager and it is therefore
more beneficial on the top layer to hire a team manager to run the team business than other two
models. Similarly, for θ ∈ [0.45, 0.862], the value function V w in the model with team managers
outperforms the value function V p in the model with voluntary partnership.
However, if the team manager is getting more greedy and aims to eat a larger chunk of the profit
pie, the remaining gain to share among team workers becomes more limited. This is illustrated by
the curve V w for θ ≥ 0.45 that V w is decreasing in θ. Moreover, as observed from Figure 1, as θ
surpasses the threshold 0.632, the dominance relationship between V w and V c is overturned and
each worker is better off if the team size is assigned by a central planner so that no extra wage
is paid from the team’s account. In the language of economics, we can interpret the first model
with team managers as an example of market economy, in which the size of each firm is decided
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by the manager based on market competition. On the other hand, we can also view the second
model with a central planner as a toy model of the planned economy, in which the government has
the right to operate the firm size of large state-owned enterprises. Our numerical example here
illustrates from the perspective of mean field competitions that under the public good allocation
scheme, the market economy is more conducive to each worker’s value when the senior management
wage stays in a reasonable range. When the salary of the team manager is too high, the centralized
management will become more preferable by the worker. Similarly, for θ > 0.862, we have that
V w falls below V p, which indicates that the role of a team manager becomes unnecessary as the
partnership organization is more beneficial to each worker and the wage amount allocated to the
team manager dominates the effect of team size costs.
It is also interesting to see from Figure 2 that the larger the equilibrium team size is, the smaller
the value V w becomes, despite that here we have no division effect. This shows the possible adverse
effect by the team size to each worker’s profit. We can observe that as the team manager gets a
higher salary (as θ increases), he is more motivated to enlarge the team size by sacrificing the
worker’s value. Comparing with z∗c and z∗p , we can also see that the role of a central planner will
not only enhance each worker’s profit, but it will also yield leaner settings and downsize the work
force by the centralized management.
4.2 Example 2
In this example, we choose β ∈ [0, 0.8), i.e., the proportion that the rank-based reward is split
between the fixed salary and the performance-based bonus for each worker, as the changing variable
and set other model parameters the same as in Example 1 that K = 203 , δ = 4, p = 2, k = 1, θ = 0.5
and κ0 = 2. We plot the comparison figures for the budget allocation scheme ε = 1.
In the first model with team managers, the condition
[
1− κ0Kθ
]
δ ≥ (2−ε)p1+p in Theorem 3.1 (ii) is
always satisfied by our chosen parameters. That is, for any β ∈ [0, 0.8), the equilibrium team size
determined by the team manager is given by z∗m ≈ 0.863, and the value of a representative worker
is given by the linear function V w = 1.931(1 + β).
In the second model with a central planner, for the case ε = 1 in Theorem 3.2, we have
κ0 <
K(1+β)
2 for any β ∈ [0, 0.8) and the optimal team size does not exist. We shall therefore skip
its graph in the Figure.
At last, in the third model with partnership within each team, by item (ii) in the case ε = 1 of
Theorem 3.3, the conditions δ ≥ 2 and 2(1 + δ) > (p+ 1)2 are satisfied. The condition K(1+β)2(p+1) < κ0
is fulfilled if and only if β ∈ [0, 0.8). Therefore, for our chosen region β < 0.8, its equilibrium team
size is given explicitly by z∗p =
(
8
27 − 1027β
) 1
4 , and the value function of each worker is computed by
V p =
(
4
3 +
10
3 β
) (
8
27 − 1027β
)−1
4 − ( 827 − 1027β) 34 .
Under the budget allocation scheme ε = 1, we now compare the model with team manager and
the model with partnership by plotting the curves of V w and V p for β ∈ [0, 0.8) in Figure 3. We
also present two equilibrium team sizes z∗m and z∗p in Figure 4 for β ∈ [0, 0.8) as below.
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Figure 3 Figure 4
First of all, we can see from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that V w and V p are increasing functions of
β and z∗p is a decreasing function of β, which are consistent with the remarks in Section 3.1 and
Section 3.3. The economic insights on the impact by β can be found therein.
For the region β ∈ [0, 0.1374] in Figure 3, we can see that V w > V p, which shows that in the
budget allocation framework, the reward scheme using a larger performance-based bonus makes
the model with team managers more competitive and appealing. To be precise, it is interesting to
see that a larger bonus incentive (as β is close to 0) corresponds to a larger equilibrium team size
z∗p in the model of partnership. Figure 3 illustrates that it is more wise for hard-working workers
(who aim to receive a high bonus) in this scenario to look for and pay a team manager who can
bear all the large team size costs for the team (as z∗p is large when β is small) instead of their
own partnership organization. As the value of β increases, the fixed salary amount plays a more
leading role in the reward scheme and the value V p grows more rapidly and eventually dominates
V w. This is consistent with some real life observations that if the rank-based reward towards the
team is fixed and the performance-based bonus is very small to incentivize the worker, the role of
a team manager becomes redundant. Workers will prefer to voluntarily gather to reduce the team
size (as z∗p decreases in Figure 4) and tolerate the small size costs by themselves, but not to join a
team in which the team manager may need to occupy a large proportion from the fixed reward pie.
On the other hand, as β → 0.8 in Figure 3, we can see that V p tends to a very satisfactory high
value. However, from Figure 4, the price to pay to lift up V p is to reduce the team size z∗p to the
extreme low value close to zero. Similar to Remark 3.3, to fit into our mean field formulation, it
is not allowed to downsize z∗p too much as the base population is fixed at the beginning. That is,
to take the advantage of the explicit intra-team equilibrium control and equilibrium team size z∗p ,
we need to balance the payment to each worker between the fixed salary amount and the relative
performance bonus by setting β not too large under the budget allocation scheme. For example, by
setting β ≈ 0.6, we can guarantee that the reasonable team size z∗p ≈ 0.522 and the value function
V p ≈ 6.247 is high enough to attract individual workers to gather as a self-organized team.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
(i) The function Vλ,z in (2.6) is well-defined by the non-negativity and integrability of λ (see the
definition of A). It is straightforward to verify that Vλ,z satisfies (2.5) and equivalently, (2.3) with
α¯ = αz, and that αz ∈ A. Standard verification argument shows that Vλ,z is the value function (in
response to (λ, z, αz)), and that αz is an optimal control.
(ii) Let αˆ ∈ A be any equilibrium control and Vˆ be the corresponding equilibrium value function
within the team. Since the best response problem within a team is time-consistent, the restriction
of αˆ on [r, 1] is optimal for Vˆ (r) (in response to (λ, z, αˆ)) for any r < 1. By the optimality of αˆ, we
have Vˆ (r) ≤ Gz(r). On the other hand, taking the admissible control α = Gz ∈ A, we obtain
Vˆ (r) ≥ βGz(1)− c2E
[∫ ρ(τ)
ρ(0)
G2z(y)
λ(y)(1− y)dy
]
≥ βGz(1)− c2E
[∫ 1
0
G2z(y)
λ(y)(1− y)dy
]
.
Letting → 0+ yields Vˆ (r) ≥ βGz(1). Because Gz(1−) = Gz(1) = 0, we must have Vˆ (1−) = 0.
Claim that Vˆ is absolutely continuous. Once this is proved, dynamic programming yields that
Vˆ must a.e. satisfy (2.3) with α¯ = αˆ, and that αˆ coincides with αz, which further implies that Vˆ
satisfies (2.5). It is easy to check that (2.5) has at most one absolutely continuous solution, namely,
(2.6). By uniqueness, we must have Vˆ = Vλ,z.
The rest is devoted to the proof of absolutely continuity of Vˆ by a control-theoretical argument
adapted from [16]. Fix an arbitrary r0 < 1. Since λ is assumed to be locally piecewise Lipschitz
and strictly positive on [0, 1), it is uniformly bounded away from zero on [0, r0]. This implies that
ρ will reach r0 in finite time. Let 0 ≤ r < r + h ≤ r0, we wish to bound Vˆ (r) − Vˆ (r + h) by a
constant times h. There are two subtle differences from the proof in [16]: First, due to the bonus
payment, monotonicity of the value function is unclear; thus, a lower bound for Vˆ (r) − Vˆ (r + h)
is no longer trivial. Second, in our model a single member has negligible impact on the team’s
completion time. Hence τ r and τ r+h (where the superscript indicates the dependence on ρ(0)) are
different regardless of how we choose a single member’s control.
Denote by ρr the state process starting at ρ(0) = r, and let th be the first time ρ
r hits r + h,
which is finite. By the memoryless property of exponential random variables and the flow property
of ρr, we have that
P (τ r ≥ th + s|τ r ≥ th) = P
(
Zi >
∫ th+s
0
zαˆ(ρr(u))du
∣∣∣Zi > ∫ th
0
zαˆ(ρr(u))du
)
= P
(
Zi >
∫ th+s
th
zαˆ(ρr(u))du
)
= P
(
Zi >
∫ s
0
zαˆ(ρr(th + u))du
)
= P
(
Zi >
∫ s
0
zαˆ(ρr+h(u))du
)
= P
(
τ r+h ≥ s
)
.
In other words, the distribution of τ r − th conditioned on the event τ r ≥ th is the same as the
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distribution of τ τ+h. Using this, we deduce that
Vˆ (r) = J(r, αˆ;λ, z, αˆ) = E
[
Gz(ρ
r(τ r))− c
∫ τr
0
αˆ(ρr(t))2 dt
]
≤ E [1{τr≤th}Gz(r)]+ P(τ r > th)E [Gz(ρr(τ r))− c∫ τr
th
αˆ(ρr(t))2 dt
∣∣∣τ r > th]
= P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(r) + P(τ r > th)E
[
Gz(ρ
r(τ r+h + th))− c
∫ τr+h+th
th
αˆ(ρr(t))2 dt
]
= P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(r) + P(τ r > th)E
[
Gz(ρ
r+h(τ r+h))− c
∫ τr+h
0
αˆ(ρr+h(t))2 dt
]
= P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(r) + P(τ r > th)J(r + h, αˆ;λ, z, αˆ)
≤ P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(0) + Vˆ (r + h).
Similarly, with
α :=
{
 on [r, r + h),
αˆ on [r + h, 1),
we can show that
Vˆ (r) ≥ J(r, α;λ, z, αˆ)
≥ P(τ r > th)E
[
Gz(ρ
r(τ r))
(
β + (1− β)α
αˆ
(ρr(τ r))
)
− c
∫ τr
th
αˆ(ρr(t))2 dt
∣∣∣τ r > th]− c2th
= P(τ r > th)E
[
Gz(ρ
r+h(τ r+h))− c
∫ τr+h
0
αˆ(ρr+h(t))2 dt
]
− c2th
= P(τ r > th)J(r + h, αˆ;λ, z, αˆ)− c2th = P(τ r > th)Vˆ (r + h)− c2th
≥ Vˆ (t+ h)− P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(0)− c2th.
Taking limit as → 0+ and combining the two chains of inequalities, we obtain
|Vˆ (r)− Vˆ (r + h)| ≤ P(τ r ≤ th)Gz(0).
It remains to note that
P(τ r ≤ th) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ th
0
zαˆ(ρr(s))ds
)
≤
∫ th
0
zαˆ(ρr(s))ds =
∫ r+h
r
zαˆ(y)dρ−1(y) =
∫ r+h
r
zαˆ(y)
λ(y)(1− y)dy
≤ ess sup
y∈[0,r0]
∣∣∣∣ zαˆ(y)λ(y)(1− y)
∣∣∣∣h.
We conclude that Vˆ is Lipschitz continuous on [0, r0] for any r0 < 1 and thus, absolutely continuous
on [0, 1).
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We only show (ii) and (iii). Suppose K(1 +p)θ > κ0 so that zero is not an equilibrium team
size. For each z¯ > 0, define
Fz¯(z) := K(1 + p)θ
[
1 + p
(z
z¯
)ε−2]−1 − kzδ, z ≥ 0.
By (3.2), z∗ is an equilibrium team size if and only if z∗ ∈ arg maxz>0 Fz∗(z) andKθ−κ0−κ(z∗) ≥ 0.
Since Fz¯ is continuous and limz→∞ Fz¯(z) = −∞, the maximum of Fz¯ is attained either at z = 0 or
at some interior point where the first derivative
F ′z¯(z) =
K(1 + p)θp(2− ε)(z/z¯)ε−3(z¯)−1
(1 + p(z/z¯)ε−2)2
− kδzδ−1
vanishes. Any positive equilibrium team size z∗ must then satisfy F ′z∗(z∗) = 0, giving the unique
candidate z∗m defined in (3.6). It remains to check that Fz∗m(z) attains global maximum at z = z
∗
m
and that Kθ − κ0 − κ(z∗m) ≥ 0.
Let us rewrite the function
Fz∗m(z) = K(1 + p)θf(z/z
∗
m),
where
f(x) :=
x2−ε
x2−ε + p
− (2− ε)p
δ(1 + p)2
xδ, x ≥ 0.
Fz∗m(z) attains global maximum at z = z
∗
m if and only if f(x) attains global maximum on R+ at
x = 1. We have
f ′(x) = (2− ε)px1−ε
[
1
(x2−ε + p)2
− x
ε+δ−2
(1 + p)2
]
.
It is easy to see that for x > 0, sgn(f ′(x)) = sgn(h(x)), where
h(x) := (1 + p)x1−
ε+δ
2 − x2−ε − p
Notice that h(1) = 0 and h′(1) = p+ ε− 1− (1 + p)(ε+ δ)/2. Consider two cases:
(i) ε+ δ ≥ 2. In this case, h is strictly decreasing, which implies f ′ is positive when 0 < x < 1
and negative when x > 1. Consequently, the global maximum of f is attained at x = 1 as desired.
(ii) ε + δ < 2. In this case, h is strictly concave, which implies that it can cross the x-axis
at most twice. As h(0) = −p < 0, x = 1 is a global maximum of f if and only if h′(1) < 0 and
f(1) ≥ f(0), i.e.,
δ >
(2− ε)p+ ε− 2
1 + p
and δ ≥ (2− ε)p
(1 + p)
.
Note that δ ≥ (2− ε)p/(1 +p) is equivalent to ε+ δ ≥ 2− δ/p. Combining the two cases, we see
that f(x) attains global maximum at x = 1 if and only if δ ≥ (2− ε)p/(1 + p). We also have that
Kθ − κ0 − κ(z∗m) = Kθ − κ0 −
Kθp(2− ε)
δ(1 + p)
≥ 0
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if and only if [
1− κ0
Kθ
]
δ ≥ (2− ε)p
1 + p
,
which implies δ ≥ (2− ε)p/(1 + p). The rest of the theorem statement follows from direct compu-
tation using (3.1), (3.6), (3.4) and (3.5).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Part 1: Let us first examine the candidate equilibrium team size z∗ = 0.
Case I :  = 0. For κ0 = 0, the conclusion I(i) of Theorem 3.3 is easy to verify. Now assume
κ0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1] ∪ [2,∞). Let us define
J(z) :=
(1 + β)K(1 + p)
2
− κ0
z
− kzδ−1, z > 0.
We get J ′(z) = κ0z−2 − k(δ − 1)zδ−2 and J ′′(z) = −2κ0z−3 − k(δ − 1)(δ − 2)zδ−3 < 0 as δ ≤ 1 or
δ ≥ 2. Therefore, the unique interior critical point zˆ :=
(
κ0
k(δ−1)
) 1
δ
is the global maximum point.
We have that
zˆJ(zˆ) =
(1 + β)K(1 + p)
2
(
κ0
k(δ − 1)
) 1
δ
− κ0 − k
(
κ0
k(δ − 1)
)
.
Then z∗ = 0 is the equilibrium team size if and only if zˆJ(zˆ) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to
2δ(κ0)
δ−1kδδ
(1 + β)δKδ(1 + p)δ(δ − 1)δ−1 ≥ 1.
Case II :  = 1. It is clear that z∗ = 0 is an equilibrium team size if (1+β)2 K(1 + p) ≤ κ0. Now
suppose that (1+β)2 K(1 + p) > κ0 and let us define
J(z) :=
(1+β)
2 K(1 + p)− κ0
z
− kzδ−1, z > 0.
We get
lim
z→0+
J(z)
1/z
= lim
z→0+
zJ(z) = lim
z→0+
(1 + β)
2
K(1 + p)− κ0 − kzδ = (1 + β)
2
K(1 + p)− κ0.
It then follows that limz→0+ J(z) = +∞ and hence z∗ = 0 is not an equilibrium team size in view
of its definition.
Part 2: Next, consider the candidate equilibrium team size z∗ > 0. We can compute from
(3.13) that
H ′(z; z∗) =
(1− ε)K(1 + p)(1 + β)
(z∗)2−ε
z1−2ε
p+ ( zz∗ )
2−ε −
(2− ε)K(1 + p)(1 + β)
2(z∗)4−2ε
z3−3ε
(p+ ( zz∗ )
2−ε)2
+
κ0
z2
+ k(1− δ)zδ−2.
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Again as team sizes are required to be positive, we only need to consider interior maxima of
H(z; z∗). Therefore, z∗ is the equilibrium team size with partnership implies that z∗ satisfies that
H ′(z∗; z∗) = 0, which gives that z∗ solves the algebraic equation[
(1− ε)K(1 + β)− (2− ε)K(1 + β)
2(p+ 1)
]
(z∗)1−ε + k(1− δ)(z∗)δ + κ0 = 0. (A.1)
Case I : ε = 0. Suppose that δ ≥ 3. If κ0 = 0, it is clear that the algebraic equation (A.1) admits
a unique positive root z∗p =
(
A
k(δ−1)
) 1
δ−1
, where we denote A := pK(1+β)(p+1) > 0. If κ0 > 0, let us
denote γ(x) := Ax+ k(1− δ)xδ +κ0. We have that limx→0 γ(x) = κ0 > 0 and limx→∞ γ(x) = −∞.
Therefore, the equation γ(x) = 0 admits at least one positive root. Moreover, we also know that
γ′(x) = A+kδ(1−δ)xδ−1 and therefore γ(x) is strictly increasing for x ≤ x∗ and strictly decreasing
for x > x∗, where
x∗ :=
(
A
kδ(δ − 1)
) 1
δ−1
. (A.2)
It then follows that the curve y = γ(x) only hits x-axis once, which implies that γ(x) = 0 admits
a unique positive root z∗p .
Case II : ε = 1. The algebraic equation (A.1) can be simplified as
−K(1 + β)
2(p+ 1)
+ k(1− δ)(z∗)δ + κ0 = 0.
It is clear that if δ ≥ 2 and K(1+β)2(p+1) < κ0, we can obtain the unique positive solution given in (3.14).
It then suffices to verify that H(z; z∗p) attains its global maximum at the unique point z = z∗p
in two cases.
Case I : ε = 0. Let us assume that δ ≥ 3 and p ≥ 1/3. We first have
H(z; z∗p) =
K(1 + p)(1 + β)
2
( zz∗p
)2
p+ ( zz∗p
)2
− κ0 + kz
δ
z
,
and
H ′(z; z∗p) =
K(1 + p)(1 + β)
(z∗p)2
z
p+ ( zz∗p
)2
− K(1 + p)(1 + β)
(z∗p)4
z3
(p+ ( zz∗p
)2)2
+
κ0
z2
+ k(1− δ)zδ−2.
It is straightforward to verify that the sign of H ′(z; z∗p) coincides with the sign of h(z; z∗p), which
is defined by
h(z; z∗p) := pK(1 + p)(1 + β)
(
z
z∗p
)3
+
(
z
z∗p
)(κ0
z
+ k(1− δ)zδ−1
)(
p+
(
z
z∗p
)2)2
=pK(1 + p)(1 + β)
(
z
z∗p
)3
+
(
z
z∗p
)(
κ0
z
z∗p
1
z∗p
+ k(1− δ)
(
z
z∗p
)δ−1
(z∗p)
δ−1
)(
p+
(
z
z∗p
)2)2
.
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Note that z∗p solves the equation Ax+ k(1− δ)xδ + κ0 = 0, we get that
h(z; z∗p) = pK(1 + p)(1 + β)
(
z
z∗p
)3
+
[
−A
(
z
z∗p
)δ
+
(
1−
(
z
z∗p
)δ)
κ0(z
∗
p)
−1
](
p+
(
z
z∗p
)2)2
.
After changing variable x = zz∗p
, we can consider the function
h(x) = pK(1 + p)(1 + β)x3 +
[
−Axδ +
(
1− xδ
)
κ0(z
∗
p)
−1
] (
p+ x2
)2
= Bx3 +
[
C − (A+ C)xδ
] (
p+ x2
)2
,
with B := pK(1 + p)(1 + β) and C := κ0(z
∗
p)
−1. First, we have h(1) = B − (p + 1)2A = 0 by
recalling that A = pK(1+β)(p+1) . Moreover, we have that
h′(1) = 3B − (p+ 1)2(A+ C)δ − 4A(p+ 1).
As A,C > 0 and δ ≥ 3, it follows that (A+C)δ ≥ 3A. As 4A(p+ 1) > 0, we can then deduce that
h′(1) < 3B − 3A(p+ 1)2 = 0 and hence z = z∗p is a local maximum of the function H(z; z∗p).
We then claim that the equation h(x) = 0, x > 0, admits a unique solution at x = 1. As
we already know that h(1) = 0 and h′(1) < 0, we will show that for any other x¯ > 0 such that
h(x¯) = 0, we always have h′(x¯) < 0 and therefore x¯ = 1 must be the unique solution as h(x) is a
continuous function. Let us then assume that x¯ 6= 1 that also satisfies
Bx¯3 +
[
C − (A+ C)x¯δ
] (
p+ x¯2
)2
= 0,
and we have
x¯
p+ x¯2
h′(x¯) =
[
3Bx¯3 − (A+ C)δx¯δ(p+ x¯2)2 + [C − (A+ C)x¯δ]4x¯2(p+ x¯2)
] 1
p+ x¯2
= −3
[
C − (A+ C)x¯δ
] (
p+ x¯2
)− (A+ C)δx¯δ(p+ x¯2) + [C − (A+ C)x¯δ]4x¯2
= C
[
x¯2 − 3p− (1 + δ)x¯2+δ + (3− δ)px¯δ
]
+A
[
(−1− δ)x¯2+δ + (3− δ)px¯δ
]
= C
[
(x¯2 − 3p)(1− x¯δ)− δx¯δ(x¯2 + p)
]
+A
[
−x¯δ ((1 + δ)x¯2 + (δ − 3)p)] =: g(x¯).
To show h′(x¯) < 0 for x¯ 6= 1, it is equivalent to show that g(x¯) < 0. First, for the second term of
g(x¯), the condition δ ≥ 3 clearly implies that (1 + δ)x¯2 + (δ − 3)p > 0 for any x > 0 and therefore
the second term is always negative for x > 0. For the first term of g(x¯), recall the condition that
p ≥ 1/3 and hence √3p ≥ 1. It is then clear to see that either if x¯ ≤ 1 or x¯ ≥ √3p, we have
(x¯2− 3p)(1− x¯δ) ≤ 0 and it follows that the first term is nonpositive. Otherwise, for 1 < x¯ < √3p,
we can also write
x¯2 − 3p− (1 + δ)x¯2+δ + (3− δ)px¯δ ≤ x¯2 − 3p− (1 + δ)x¯2 + (3− δ)p < 0.
This verifies the claim that g(x¯) < 0 for any x¯ ≥ 0. We can then conclude that the claim holds
and x = 1 is the unique solution such that h(x) = 0. It follows that H(z; z∗p) admits a unique
critical point z = z∗p and hence the local maximum is also the global maximum.
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Case II : ε = 1. We have that
H(z; z∗p) =
K(1 + p)(1 + β)
2
1
pz∗p + z
− κ0 + kz
δ
z
,
as well as
H ′(z; z∗p) =
−K(1 + p)(1 + β)
2
1
(pz∗p + z)2
+
κ0
z2
+ k(1− δ)zδ−2.
It is clear that the sign of the function H ′(z; z∗p) coincides with the sign of the function
h(z; z∗p) :=
−K(1 + p)(1 + β)
2
(
z
z∗p
)2
+
[
κ0 + k(1− δ)(z∗p)δ
(
z
z∗p
)δ] [
p+
z
z∗p
]2
.
After changing variable, we can consider the function
h(x) = Ax2 +B
(
x2+δ + 2x1+δ + xδ
)
+ κ0(p+ x)
2,
where A := −K(1+p)(1+β)2 and B := (z
∗
p)
δk(1− δ) = K(1+β)2(p+1) − κ0.
Note that h(1) = 0. Moreover, we have that
h′(1) =
[
2(1 + δ)
(p+ 1)2
− 1
]
K(1 + p)(1 + β)− κ0 [4(1 + δ)− 2(p+ 1)] .
By the assumption that 2(1+δ) > (p+1)2, we get 2(1+δ) > (p+1) as well and hence
2(1+δ)
(p+1)2
−1
4(1+δ)−2(p+1) ≤
1
2(p+1)2
. We obtain that h′(1) <
[
K(1+β)
2(p+1) − κ0
]
[4(1 + δ)− 2(p+ 1)] < 0 as we assume K(1+β)2(p+1) < κ0.
Again, it follows that z∗p is a local maximum of the function H(z; z∗p).
We then claim that the equation h(x) = 0, x > 0, admits a unique solution. We again show
that for any point x¯ such that h(x¯) = 0, we always have h′(x¯) < 0. Let us assume that x¯ satisfies
Ax¯2 +B
(
x¯2+δ + 2x¯1+δ + x¯δ
)
+ κ0(p+ x¯)
2 = 0,
and check that
x¯h′(x¯) =2Ax¯2 +B
(
(2 + δ)x¯2+δ + 2(1 + δ)x¯1+δ + δx¯δ
)
+ κ02x¯(p+ x¯)
=− 2B
(
x¯2+δ + 2x¯1+δ + x¯δ
)
− 2κ0(p+ x¯)2 +B
(
(2 + δ)x¯2+δ + 2(1 + δ)x¯1+δ + δx¯δ
)
+ κ02x¯(p+ x¯)
=B
(
δx¯2+δ + (2δ − 2)x¯1+δ + (δ − 2)x¯δ
)
− 2pκ0(p+ x¯).
As δ ≥ 2, the quadratic function δx¯2 + (2δ− 2)x¯+ (δ− 2) > 0 for any x > 0. Thanks to B < 0, we
have h′(x¯) < 0 for any x¯ > 0 if h(x¯) = 0. This leads to the fact that x¯ = 1 is the unique solution
to the equation h(x) = 1 as h(x) is a continuous function. It then yields that the function H(z; z∗p)
admits a unique critical point. Therefore, z∗p is the global maximum of H(z; z∗p), which completes
the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Recall the function H defined in (3.13). z∗p > 0 is an equilibrium only if H ′(z; z∗p)|z=z∗p = 0,
which is equivalent to
Kα(ε, p)(1 + β)(z∗p)
1−ε = −κ0 + k(δ − 1)(z∗p)δ, (A.3)
where
α(ε, p) := 1− ε− 2− ε
2(p+ 1)
.
As δ > 1, the functions z 7→ Kα(ε, p)(1 + β)z1−ε and z 7→ −κ0 + k(δ − 1)zδ have at most one
intersection point z∗p > 0 for z > 0.
Note that α(ε, p) > 0 ⇔ 2p − 2pε − ε > 0, and if this holds, it can be easily seen that z∗p is
increasing w.r.t. β. Similarly we can show the monotonicity of z∗p w.r.t. β when α(ε, p) = 0 and
α(ε, p) < 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Consider
d
dβ
V p(β, zp∗(β)) =
∂
∂β
V p(β, zp∗(β)) +
∂
∂z
V p(β, zp∗(β)) ·
d
dβ
z∗p(β)
=
K
2
(z∗p)
−ε +
∂
∂z
V p(β, zp∗(β)) ·
d
dβ
z∗p(β).
We have that
∂
∂z
V p(β, zp∗(β)) = (z
∗
p)
−2
[
−K(1 + β)ε
2
(z∗p)
1−ε + κ0 − k(δ − 1)(z∗p)δ
]
= −(z∗p)−2
[
K(1 + β)ε
2
(z∗p)
1−ε +Kα(ε, p)(1 + β)(z∗p)
1−ε
]
= −(z∗p)−1−ε ·
K(1 + β)
2(p+ 1)
· p(2− ε),
where the second equality follows from (A.3). Therefore,
d
dβ
V p(β, zp∗(β)) =
K(z∗p)−1−ε
2
[
z∗p −
1 + β
1 + p
· p(2− ε) · d
dβ
z∗p(β)
]
.
By Proposition 3.1, when 2p− 2pε− ε ≤ 0, ddβ z∗p(β) ≤ 0 and thus ddβV p(β, zp∗(β)) ≥ 0. For the rest
of the proof we assume 2p− 2pε− ε > 0.
By (A.3) we have that
d
dβ
z∗p(β) =
Kα(ε, p)
κ0(1− ε)(z∗p)ε−2 + k(δ − 1)(δ + ε− 1)(z∗p)δ+ε−2
.
Since 2p− 2pε− ε > 0⇔ α(ε, p) > 0, we deduce that
d
dβ
z∗p(β) ≤
Kα(ε, p)
k(δ − 1)(δ + ε− 1)(z∗p)δ+ε−2
.
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It follows that
d
dβ
V p(β, zp∗(β)) ≥
K(z∗p)−1−ε
2
[
z∗p −
1 + β
1 + p
· p(2− ε) · Kα(ε, p)
k(δ − 1)(δ + ε− 1)(z∗p)δ+ε−2
]
=
K(z∗p)−1−ε
2
[
z∗p −
p(2− ε)
1 + p
· −κ0(z
∗
p)
ε−1 + k(δ − 1)(z∗p)δ+ε−1
k(δ − 1)(δ + ε− 1)(z∗p)δ+ε−2
]
≥ K(z
∗
p)
−ε
2
[
1− p(2− ε)
(1 + p)(δ + ε− 1)
]
,
where the second equality follows from (A.3). This completes the proof.
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